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Abstract—The multiple-input single-output interference chan-
nel is considered. Each transmitter is assumed to know the
channels between itself and all receivers perfectly and the re-
ceivers are assumed to treat interference as additive noise. In this
setting, noncooperative transmission does not take into account
the interference generated at other receivers which generally
leads to inefficient performance of the links. To improve this
situation, we study cooperation between the links using coalitional
games. The players (links) in a coalition either perform zero
forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding to each other. The
ǫ-core is a solution concept for coalitional games which takes into
account the overhead required in coalition deviation. We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for the strong and weak ǫ-
core of our coalitional game not to be empty with zero forcing
transmission. Since, the ǫ-core only considers the possibility of
joint cooperation of all links, we study coalitional games in
partition form in which several distinct coalitions can form.
We propose a polynomial time distributed coalition formation
algorithm based on coalition merging and prove that its solution
lies in the coalition structure stable set of our coalition formation
game. Simulation results reveal the cooperation gains for different
coalition formation complexities and deviation overhead models.
Index Terms—interference channel; beamforming; coalitional
games; epsilon-core; coalition structure stable set
I. INTRODUCTION
In multiuser interference networks, interference can be the
main cause for performance degradation of the systems [2].
With the use of multiple antennas at the transmitters, interfer-
ence can be managed through cooperative beamforming tech-
niques. For this purpose, backhaul connections are necessary
in order to exchange information for cooperation between the
transmitters [2]. In this work, we consider cooperation between
the transmitters at the beamforming level only, i.e., information
concerning the joint choice of beamforming vectors at the
transmitters is exchanged between the transmitters but not the
signals intended to the users.
The system we consider consists of a set of transmitter-
receiver pairs which operate in the same spectral band. The
transmitters use multiple antennas while the receivers have
single antennas. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input
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single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC) [3]. Next, we
describe existing work on beamforming mechanisms in this
setting assuming perfect channel state information (CSI) at
the transmitters and single-user decoding at the receivers.
A. Beamforming in the MISO interference channel
Optimal beamforming in the MISO IFC corresponds to
rate tuples at which it is not possible to strictly improve
the performance of the users jointly. Such points are called
Pareto optimal. Finding special Pareto optimal operating points
in the MISO IFC such as the maximum weighted sum-rate,
geometric mean, and proportional-fair rate points are NP-hard
problems [4]. However, finding the max-min Pareto optimal
operating point is polynomial time solvable [4]. In [5], two
distributed algorithms are proposed to compute the max-min
operating point. After exchanging optimization parameters,
the computational load of the beamforming vectors is carried
out sequentially at the transmitters. In [6], a monotonic op-
timization framework is proposed to find points such as the
maximum sum-rate operating point in general MISO settings
with imperfect channel state information at the transmitters.
The interested reader is referred to [7] for characterizations of
optimal beamforming in MISO settings.
Since optimal beamforming requires high information ex-
change between the transmitters (or central controller), low
complexity and distributed transmission schemes are desirable
for practical implementation. When utilizing the reciprocity
of the uplink channel in time division duplex (TDD) systems,
each transmitter is able obtain perfect local CSI of the channels
between itself and all receivers [8]. Cooperative beamforming
schemes based on local CSI do not require CSI exchange
through the backhaul connections and are hence favorable [2].
One cooperative beamforming scheme which requires local
CSI is zero forcing (ZF) transmission. This transmission
scheme produces no interference at unintended receivers.
Heuristic ZF transmission schemes in multicell settings have
been proposed in [9], [10], where the objective is to efficiently
select a subset of receivers at which interference is to be
nulled. In [9], the transmitters perform ZF to receivers which
are mostly affected by interference. In [10], a successive
greedy user selection approach is applied with the objective
of maximizing the system sum-rate. Another beamforming
scheme which requires local CSI is Wiener filter (WF) precod-
ing1 [11]. Joint WF precoding in MISO IFC is proposed in [12]
as a non-iterative cooperation scheme. For the two-user case,
the obtained operating point is proven to be Pareto optimal.
Furthermore, in [13], the authors study the reciprocity of the
1Also called minimum mean square error (MMSE) transmit beamforming.
2uplink and downlink channels in the MISO IFC to formulate
a distributed beamforming scheme in the MISO IFC. In the
proposed beamforming schemes in [12], [13], all transmitters
cooperate with each other.
Joint cooperation between the links does not necessarily
lead to an improvement in the rates of the users compared
to a noncooperative and noncomplex beamforming method.
Accordingly, a user may not have the incentive to cooperate
with all other users. It is then of interest to devise stable
cooperative mechanisms that also determine which links would
cooperate voluntarily with each other.
Game theory provides appropriate models for designing
distributed resource allocation mechanisms. The conflict in
multiple antenna interference channels is studied using game
theory in [14]. The noncooperative operating point (Nash equi-
librium) in the MISO IFC corresponds to joint maximum ratio
transmission (MRT). This strategy is found to be generally not
efficient [15]. In order to improve the performance of the Nash
equilibrium, interference pricing is applied in [16].
Cooperative games in the MISO IFC have been applied
in [17], [18], [19]. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution from
axiomatic bargaining theory is studied in the MISO IFC in [17]
and an algorithm is provided to reach the solution. In the two-
user case, all cooperative solutions, called exchange equilibria,
are characterized in [18] and a distributed mechanism is
proposed to reach the Walrasian equilibrium in the setting.
Using strategic bargaining, an operating point in the set of
exchange equilibria is reached requiring two-bit signaling
between the transmitters in [19]. The approaches in [18], [19]
are however limited to the two-user case.
B. Applications of Coalitional Games in Partition Form
Coalitional games provide structured methods to determine
possible cooperation between rational players. A tutorial on the
application of coalitional games in communication networks
can be found in [20]. In these games, a coalition is a set of
players which would cooperate to achieve a joint performance
improvement. In interference networks, the performance of a
coalition of players depends on the coalitions formed outside
the coalition. Appropriate in this context are coalitional games
in partition form [21] which take into account what the players
achieve given a coalition structure, a partition of the set of
users into disjoint cooperative sets.
There are different stability concepts for coalitional games
in partition form. In [22], Dhp-stability is proposed which is
based on deviation rules of coalition merging and splitting.
The stability concept is used for games with transferable
utility in [23] and also applied in [1] in the MISO IFC for
games with nontransferable utility and partition form. The
recursive core [24] solution concept for coalitional games in
partition form has been applied in [25], [26]. In [25], the set
of cooperating base stations (a coalition) performs interference
alignment. An algorithm is proposed in which the coalitions
can arbitrarily merge and split and proven to converge to
an element in the recursive core. In [26], MISO channels
are considered and the set of cooperating transmitters apply
network MIMO techniques. Coalition formation in [26] is
restricted to merging of pairs of coalitions only supporting
low complexity implementation.
While in Dhp-stability and the recursive core solution con-
cepts a set of players can deviate and form new coalitions,
individual based stability [27] restricts only a single player
to leave a coalition and join another. A deviation in which
a user leaves a coalition and joins another if this improves
his payoff leads to Nash stability [28] and has been used in
[29] in the context of channel sensing and access in cognitive
radio. In [30], individual stability which is a weaker stability
concept than Nash stability is used for coalitional games in the
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) interference channel.
A coalition of links cooperate by performing ZF to each other.
Individual stability requires additional to Nash stability the
constraint that the payoffs of the members of the coalition in
which the deviator wants to join do not decrease.
C. Contributions
We consider coalitional games without transferable utilities
[31] among the links. While noncooperative transmission
corresponds to MRT, we restrict cooperation between a set
of links to either ZF transmission or WF precoding. In [1],
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a nonempty core of
the coalitional game with ZF transmission are characterized. In
this work, we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions
for nonempty strong and weak ǫ-core [32] of the coalitional
game with ZF beamforming. The ǫ-core generalizes the core
solution concept and includes an overhead for the deviation
of a coalition. In contrast to the result in [1] which specifies
an SNR threshold above which the core is not empty, the ǫ-
core is not empty above an SNR threshold and also below
a specific SNR threshold. These thresholds depend on the
deviation overhead measure and the user channels.
While the strong and weak ǫ-core solution concepts consider
the stability of the grand coalition only, we study coalitional
games in partition form in which several distinct coalitions
can form. In [1], coalition formation based on merging and
splitting of coalitions has been applied. In this work, we
propose a distributed coalition formation algorithm based on
coalition merging only. We propose a coalition deviation rule,
q-Deviation, to incorporate a parameter q which regulates the
complexity for finding deviating coalitions. The outcome of
the coalition formation algorithm is proven to be inside the
coalition structure stable set [33] of our coalition formation
game. Accordingly, the stability of the obtained partition of the
links is ensured. We provide an implementation of the coalition
formation algorithm and show that only two-bit signaling
between the transmitters is needed. Moreover, we prove that
the proposed coalition formation algorithm terminates in poly-
nomial time. Simulation results reveal the tradeoff between
coalition formation complexity and the obtained performance
of the links. In addition, we compare our algorithm regarding
complexity and performance to the algorithms in [26] and [30].
To the best of our knowledge, the application of the ǫ-core of
coalitional games and the coalition structure stable set solution
concepts are new for resource allocation in wireless networks.
Note, that the coalition structure stable set solution concept
3for coalitional games in partition form is different than the
recursive core [24] solution concept used in [25], [26].
Outline: In Section II, we provide the system and channel
model and also describe the noncooperative state of the links.
In Section III, the game in coalitional form is formulated
and its solution is analyzed. In Section IV, we formulate the
game in partition form and specify our coalition formation
mechanism. We also study the complexity of the proposed de-
viation model and provide an implementation of the coalition
formation algorithm in our considered system. In Section V,
we provide simulation results before we draw the conclusions
in Section VI.
Notations: Column vectors and matrices are given in low-
ercase and uppercase boldface letters, respectively. ‖a‖ is the
Euclidean norm of a ∈ CN . |b| and |S| denote the absolute
value of b ∈ C, and the cardinality of a set S, respectively.
(·)H denotes the Hermitian transpose. The orthogonal projec-
tor onto the null space of Z is Π⊥Z := I − Z(ZHZ)−1ZH ,
where I is an identity matrix. (xi)i∈S denotes a profile
with the elements corresponding to the set S. The notation
f(x) ∈ O(g(x)) means that the asymptotic growth of f(x) in
x is upper bounded by g(x).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System and Channel Model
Consider a K-user MISO IFC and define the set of links as
N := {1, ...,K}. Each transmitter i is equipped with Ni ≥ 2
antennas, and each receiver with a single antenna. The quasi-
static block flat-fading channel vector from transmitter i to
receiver j is denoted by hij ∈ CNi×1. Each transmitter is
assumed to have perfect local CSI. The local CSI is gained
through uplink training pilot signals [8]. Here, we assume time
division duplex (TDD) systems with sufficiently low delay
between the downlink and uplink time slots such that, using
channel reciprocity, the downlink channels are estimated to be
the same as the uplink channels.
The beamforming vector used by a transmitter i is denoted
by wi ∈ Ai, where the set Ai is the strategy space of
transmitter i defined as
Ai := {w ∈ CNi×1 : ‖w‖2 ≤ 1}, (1)
where we assumed a total power constraint of one (w.l.o.g.).
The basic model for the matched-filtered, symbol-sampled
complex baseband data received at receiver i is
yi = h
H
iiwisi +
∑
j 6=i
hHjiwjsj + ni, (2)
where sj ∼ CN (0, 1) is the symbol transmitted by transmitter
j and ni ∼ CN (0, σ2) is additive white Gaussian noise.
We assume that all signal and noise variables are statistically
independent. Throughout, we define the SNR as 1/σ2.
A strategy profile is a joint choice of strategies of all
transmitters defined as
(w1, ...,wK) ∈ X := A1 × · · · × AK . (3)
Given a strategy profile, the achievable rate of link i is
ui(w1, ...,wK) = log2
(
1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2
)
, (4)
where we assume single-user decoding receivers.
B. Noncooperative Operation
In game theory, games in strategic form describe outcomes
of a conflict situation between noncooperative entities. A
strategic game is defined by the tuple 〈N ,X , (ui)i∈N 〉, where
N is the set of players (links), X is the strategy space of
the players given in (3), and uk is the utility function of
player k given in (4). In [34], it is shown that maximum ratio
transmission (MRT), written for a transmitter i as
wMRTi = hii/‖hii‖, (5)
is a unique dominant strategy. A dominant strategy equilibrium
[31, Definition 181.1] of a strategic game is a strategy profile
(w∗1, ...,w
∗
K) such that for every player i ∈ N
ui(w
∗
i ,w−i) ≥ ui(wi,w−i), ∀(wi,w−i) ∈ X , (6)
where w−i := (wj)j∈N\{i} is the collection of beam-
forming vectors of all users other than user i. Hence, each
transmitter chooses MRT irrespective of the strategy choice
of the other transmitters. Consequently, the strategy profile
(wMRT1 , ...,w
MRT
K ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the strategic
game between the links. In [15], it is shown that joint MRT is
near to the Pareto boundary of the achievable rate region in the
low SNR regime. In the high SNR regime, joint MRT has poor
performance [34] while zero forcing (ZF) transmission is near
to the Pareto boundary [15]. However, ZF beamforming cannot
be implemented if the links are not cooperative. Therefore, we
will study cooperative games between the links.
III. COALITIONAL GAME
A. Game in Coalitional Form
In game theory, cooperative games are described by games
in coalitional form. A game in coalitional form [31, Definition
268.2] is defined by the tuple
〈N ,X , V, (ui)i∈N 〉, (7)
where N is the set of players, X is the set of possible joint
actions of the players in (3), V assigns to every coalition S (a
nonempty subset of N ) a set V (S) ⊆ X , and uk is the utility
of player k given in (4). A coalition S is a set of players that
are willing to cooperate, and V (S) defines their joint feasible
strategies. The game considered in (7) is in characteristic form
and the mapping V (S), called the characteristic function,
assumes a specific behaviour for the players outside S.
There exist several models that describe the behavior of the
players outside S [35]. For our model, we adopt the γ-model
from [36] and specify that all players outside a coalition S
do not cooperate, i.e., build single-player coalitions. Later in
Section IV, we consider a coalitional game in partition form in
which the formation of several coalitions is feasible. Through-
out, we assume that the payoff of a player in a coalition
cannot be transferred to other players in the same coalition.
Thus, we consider games with nontransferable utilities which
is appropriate for our model in which the achievable rate of
one link cannot be utilized at other links.
4A solution of the coalitional game is the core which is a
set of joint strategies in X with which all players want to
cooperate in a grand coalition and any deviating coalition
cannot guarantee higher utilities to all its members. With this
respect, the core strategies are stable. We adopt the following
variant of the core [32].2
Definition 1: The weak ǫ-core of a coalitional game is the
set of all strategy profiles (xi)i∈N ∈ V (N ) for which there is
no coalition S and (yi)i∈N ∈ V (S) such that ui(y1, ...,yK)−
ǫi > ui(x1, ...,xK) with ǫi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.
The weak ǫ-core is not empty if there exists no coalition
S ⊂ N whose members achieve higher payoff than in
the grand coalition N taking the additional overhead ǫi in
deviation of each player i ∈ S into account. Alternatively, ǫi
can be considered as a reward which is given to player i in
order to motivate him to stay in the grand coalition. However,
since in our model, no external entity is assumed which can
give such a reward to the users, the interpretation of ǫi as an
overhead is more appropriate. Incorporating the overhead in
the solution concept is appropriate in communication networks
since coalition deviation requires an additional complexity
for searching for possible coalitions to cooperate with. This
overhead is discussed later in Section IV-A in detail.
In Definition 1, the overhead ǫi for deviation of a player i in
a coalition S is fixed. A stronger notion for the weak ǫ-core
accounts for an overhead which depends on the size of the
coalition which deviates.
Definition 2: The strong ǫ-core of a coalitional game is the
set of all strategy profiles (xi)i∈N ∈ V (N ) for which there is
no coalition S and (yi)i∈N ∈ V (S) such that ui(y1, ...,yK)−
ǫi/|S| > ui(x1, ...,xK) with ǫi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.
The interpretation of the overhead in the definition of the
strong ǫ-core originates from the original definition in [32] for
games with transferable utility where the overhead ǫ required
for the deviating coalition S is shared by its members. Hence,
the overhead decreases for each member of S as the size of
S increases. This is in contrast to the weak ǫ-core where the
overhead is constant for each player. The strong and weak
ǫ-core definitions can be regarded as generalizations of the
traditional solution concept of the core for which the overhead
is set as ǫi = 0 for all i ∈ N . Interestingly, taking into account
the deviation overhead, the solution set of the coalitional game
is enlarged, i.e., the core is a subset of the strong ǫ-core [32].
Also, the strong ǫ-core is a subset of the weak ǫ-core. For
coalitional games in which the core is empty, including the
overhead in the deviation could lead to stability of the system.
Next, we will specify the characteristic function V (S).
While we adopt the γ-model to assume that the players outside
a coalition are noncooperative, in order to define V (S) we
need to specify the cooperation strategies in a coalition S. We
consider two simple non-iterative transmission schemes which
can be applied in a distributed manner. These are ZF and WF
beamforming defined in the next subsections.
2The definition of ǫ-core in [32] is for games with transferable utility. Here
we formulate the solution concept for games with nontransferable utility such
that the overhead ǫ is different for each player and not transferable to other
players in its coalition.
B. Coalitional Game with Zero Forcing Beamforming
The transmitters choose MRT if they are not cooperative
according to Section II-B. If a transmitter cooperates with
a set of links, then it performs ZF in the direction of the
corresponding receivers. Hence, we define the mapping
V ZF(S) = {(wi)i∈N ∈ X : wi = wZFi→S for i ∈ S,
wj = w
MRT
j for j ∈ N\S}, (8)
where wZFi→S is transmitter i’s ZF beamforming vector to the
links in S written as
wZFi→S =
Π⊥
Zi→S
hii
‖Π⊥
Zi→S
hii‖ , Zi→S = (hij)j∈S\{i}. (9)
Observe that if the number of antennas Ni < |S|, then ZF in
(9) is the zero vector, i.e. transmitter i switches its transmission
off. Similar to the definition of the strategy profile V ZF(S) in
(8), it is possible to consider different cooperative transmit
beamforming than ZF in a coalition.
According to Definition 1, the weak ǫ-core is not empty if
and only if
ui(V
ZF(S))−ǫi ≤ ui(V ZF(N )), ∀i ∈ S and ∀S ⊂ N . (10)
The next result provides the conditions under which the weak
ǫ-core of our game is not empty.
Proposition 1: For ǫi > 0 for all i ∈ N , the weak ǫ-core
is not empty if and only if the noise power satisfies σ2 ≤ σ¯2
and σ2 ≥ σ2 where
σ¯2 := min
S⊂N
min
i∈S
{
σ¯2i,S
}
, σ2 := max
S⊂N
max
i∈S
{
σ2i,S
}
, (11)
with
σ¯2i,S :=
{ ∞, ∆i,S < 0 or Ψi,S ≥ 0;
−Ψi,S−
√
∆i,S
2(2ǫi−1) , ∆i,S ≥ 0 and Ψi,S < 0;
(12)
and
σ2i,S :=
{
0, ∆i,S < 0 or Ψi,S ≥ 0;
−Ψi,S+
√
∆i,S
2(2ǫi−1) , ∆i,S ≥ 0 and Ψi,S < 0;
(13)
and the used parameters are defined as
∆i,S := Ψ
2
i,S − 4(2ǫi − 1)2ǫiCiBi,S , (14a)
Ψi,S := (2
ǫi(Bi,S + Ci)− (Bi,S +Ai,S)), (14b)
Ai,S := |hHiiwZFi→S |2, (14c)
Bi,S :=
∑
j∈N\S
|hHjiwMRTj |2, Ci := |hHiiwZFi→N |2. (14d)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 implies that for all SNR values 1/σ2 ≥ 1/σ¯2
and 1/σ2 ≤ 1/σ2 it is profitable for all players to jointly
perform ZF. In the case where the overhead ǫi = 0 for all
players, the conditions under which the core is not empty have
been given in [1, Proposition 1] and restated below as a special
case of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1: For ǫi = 0 for all i ∈ N , the weak ǫ-core is
not empty if and only if σ2 ≤ σˆ2 where
σˆ2 := min
S⊂N
min
i∈S
{Bi,SCi/(Ai,S − Ci)}. (15)
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Fig. 1. A setting with 8 links and each transmitter uses 8 antennas. In order
to include the effect of distances between the links on the received power
gains we use the following path loss model: Let dkℓ be the distance between
transmitter k and a receiver ℓ in meters and δ be the path loss exponent, we
write the channel vector hkℓ = d
−δ/2
kℓ h˜kℓ/‖h˜kℓ‖ with h˜kℓ ∼ CN (0, I).
We define the SNR as SNR= d−δkk /σ
2 and we set δ = 3.
Interestingly, in comparison to the core without deviation
overhead, the weak ǫ-core is not empty above an SNR thresh-
old and also below an SNR threshold. The weak ǫ-core is
also not empty at low SNR is due to the fact that the noise
power at low SNR is much larger than the interference. Then,
the performance difference between joint ZF beamforming in
the grand coalition compared to the performance of another
beamforming strategy is not large enough to compensate for
the overhead leading to the formation of the grand coalition.
The derivation of the conditions for nonempty strong ǫ-core
in Definition 2 is analogous to that in Proposition 1 in which
for a player i ∈ S, the term ǫi is replaced with ǫi/|S|. It must
be noted that in order to calculate the conditions for nonempty
weak and strong ǫ-core in Proposition 1, an exhaustive search
over 2|N | − 1 nonempty subsets of N must be performed.
In Fig. 2, we plot the conditions for empty strong and
weak ǫ-core from Proposition 1 for the setting in Fig. 1. Only
for an overhead strictly larger than zero does a lower SNR
threshold exists for nonempty strong and weak ǫ-core. As the
overhead increases, the lower threshold 1/σ¯2 increases and the
upper threshold 1/σ2 decreases. Consequently, the SNR region
where all players have an incentive to jointly perform ZF
transmission becomes larger. It is shown that if the conditions
for the weak ǫ-core not to be empty are satisfied then they are
also satisfied for the strong ǫ-core. The operation of wireless
systems is usually in the range between 5 and 20 dB SNR. It
can be seen from Fig. 2 that the conditions for the stability of
the grand coalition with ZF beamforming requires relatively
higher overhead measure at the links.
There is a relation between the result in Proposition 1 and
the notion of cost of stability [37]. In [37], it is assumed that
all users have the same ǫi. The cost of stability specifies the
smallest overhead ǫi such that the weak ǫ-core is not empty.
Fig. 2 illustrates the cost of stability which corresponds to
the overhead ǫ on the boundary points of the region where
the weak ǫ-core is empty. That is, for a fixed SNR value, the
boundary point is the smallest overhead value with which the
weak ǫ-core is not empty.
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Fig. 2. Conditions for empty strong and weak ǫ-cores are plotted in the
filled regions for the setting with 8 links in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 2, it is shown that above a certain overhead level, the
ǫ-core is nonempty for any SNR value. This overhead level is
obtained during the proof of Proposition 1 and stated here.
Corollary 2: The weak ǫ-core is not empty for any σ2 > 0
if and only if ∆i,S < 0 or Ψi,S ≥ 0, for all i ∈ S,S ⊂ N ,
where ∆i,S and Ψi,S are given, respectively, in (14a) and (14b)
in Proposition 1.
From Corollary 1, in the case where the overhead ǫi is zero
for all i ∈ N , the core is not empty only above an SNR
threshold. Next, we show that also in this case, a player does
not have an incentive to build a coalition with another player
at low SNR, i.e.,
ui(V
ZF({i})) > ui(V ZF(S)), ∀i ∈ S, ∀S ⊆ N , |S| > 1. (16)
Notice that V ZF({i}) = (wMRT1 , ...,wMRTK ). The conditions for
(16) to hold are given in [1, Proposition 2] and restated here.
Proposition 2: Single-player coalitions exist if
σ2 > σˇ2 := max
S⊆N
max
i∈S
{
Ai,SBi,{i} − ‖hii‖2Bi,S
‖hii‖2 −Ai,S
}
, (17)
with Ai,S and Bi,S defined in (14c) and (14d), respectively.
C. Coalitional Game with Wiener Filter Precoding
In this section, we assume the players cooperate by perform-
ing WF precoding with the players in their own coalition. For
link i in coalition S, transmitter i’s WF precoding is
wWFi→S =
(Iσ2 +
∑
j∈S\{i} hijh
H
ij )
−1hii
‖(Iσ2 +∑j∈S\{i} hijhHij )−1hii‖ . (18)
In comparison to ZF beamforming in (9), WF precoding is
suitable when the number of antennas at the transmitters
is smaller than the number of links in the coalition. WF
precoding in (18) has interesting behavior for asymptotic SNR
cases [11]. In the high SNR regime (σ2 → 0),wWFi→S converges
to wZFi→S in (9). In the low SNR regime (σ2 → ∞), wWFi→S
converges to wMRTi in (5).
The game in coalitional form with WF precoding is
〈N ,X , V WF, (Rk)k∈N 〉 where the mapping V WF which defines
the strategy profile according to WF cooperation scheme is
V WF(S) = {(wk)k∈N ∈ X : wk = wWFk→S for k ∈ S,
wℓ = w
MRT
ℓ for ℓ ∈ N\S}. (19)
6Conditions for nonempty strong and weak ǫ-core of the coali-
tional game with WF precoding in terms of SNR thresholds
are hard to characterize because the noise power in (18) is
inside the matrix inverse.
Next, we will study coalition formation games between
the links and use the WF and ZF beamforming schemes as
cooperative beamforming strategies.
IV. COALITION FORMATION
In the previous section, we have used the strong and weak
ǫ-core as solutions to our coalitional game which only consider
the feasibility of the formation of the grand coalition. In this
section, we enable the formation of several disjoint coalitions
to form a coalition structure. A coalition structure C is a parti-
tion of N , the grand coalition, into a set of disjoint coalitions
{S1, ...,SL} where
⋃L
j=1 Sj = N and
⋂L
j=1 Sj = ∅.
Let P denote the set of all partitions of N . We consider the
following game in partition form [21]:3
〈N ,X , F, (ui)i∈N 〉, (20)
where F : P → X is called the partition function. We
consider two scenarios for player cooperation in a coalition.
The scenarios correspond to ZF and WF transmissions. Given
a coalition structure C, the strategy profile of the players
according to ZF or WF is defined by
F bf(C) := {(wi)i∈N ∈ X : wi = wbfi→Sj for i ∈ Sj ,Sj ∈ C},
(21)
where bf = {ZF,WF} with wZFi→Sj and wWFi→Sj defined in (9)
and (18), respectively. Notice that if |Sj | = 1 and i ∈ Sj ,
then wZFi→Sj = w
WF
i→Sj
= wMRTi . For a coalition structure C,
F ZF(C) is a strategy profile in which each player chooses ZF
to the players in his coalition. Similarly, FWF(C) is the strategy
profile when WF is applied. In our case, the coalition structure
uniquely determines the associated strategy of each player.
Consequently, the payoff of each player is directly related to
the formed coalition structure.
The payoffs of the members of a coalition depend on which
coalitions form outside. The effects caused by other coalitions
on a specific coalition are called externalities [38]. In our
game, due to the interference coupling between the links,
externalities exist. These are categorized under negative and
positive externalities. In the case of negative externalities, the
merging of two coalitions reduces the utility of the other
coalitions. While positive externalities lead to an increase in
the payoff of other coalitions when two coalitions merge. In
our case, if two coalitions merge, both types of externalities
can occur.
The dynamics that lead to a specific coalition structure
are the study of coalition formation games [39], [35]. We
are interested in coalition structures which are stable. The
main steps to describe the dynamics of coalition formation to
reach a stable coalition structure are the following: First, we
must specify a deviation rule. This rule describes the feasible
transition from one coalition structure to the next. The second
3In [21], the game in partition form is represented by 〈N , U〉 where U :
P → RK . We change the notation to be analogous to the coalitional game
formulation in (7).
Algorithm 1 Coalition formation algorithm.
1: Input: N , (ǫ1, . . . , ǫK), q
2: Initilize: k = 0, C0 = {{1}, . . . , {K}}
3: for T ⊂ Ck, |T | ≤ q do
4: Ck q,T−→ Ck+1;
5: if Ck ≺T Ck+1 then
6: k = k + 1;
7: Go to Step 2;
8: Output: Ck
step is to define a comparison relation between different
coalition structures. Accordingly, a feasible deviation from one
coalition structure to the next is acceptable if this leads to a
preferable coalition structure. Afterwards, the stability of the
coalition formation process must be studied. For this purpose,
a stability concept for coalition structures must be specified.
A set T of at most q coalitions in some arbitrary coalition
structure C0 ∈ P can merge to form a single coalition. In
doing so, the coalition structure C0 changes to C1 ∈ P . We
formally define this mechanism as follows.
Definition 3 (q-Deviation): The notation C0 q,T−→ C1 indi-
cates that the coalitions in T , where T ⊂ C0 ∈ P and |T | ≤ q
merge to form the coalition S = ⋃ T . Then, the coalition
structure C0 changes to C1 = C0 \T ∪S in the set of coalition
structures P .
The motivation behind the merging deviation model in Defi-
nition 3 is that coalition formations starts from the noncoop-
erative state of single-player coalitions and hence cooperation
requires merging of coalitions. The deviation complexity in
Definition 3 is tunable through the parameter q. The larger q
is, the more complex it is to search for possible merging coali-
tions since the number of possible combinations increases with
q. We study the complexity for this search in Section IV-A.
Given a coalition structure, we assume that the coalitions
can communicate with each other in order to find possible
performance improvement through deviation. A deviating set
of coalitions T according to q-Deviation in Definition 3 can
compare the resulting coalition structure C1 with the previous
coalition structure C0 by the Pareto dominance relation ≺T
specified as follows:
C0 ≺T C1 ⇔
∀i ∈
⋃
T : ui(F bf(C0))− ǫi ≤ ui(F bf(C1)), and
∃j ∈
⋃
T : uj(F bf(C0))− ǫi < uj(F bf(C1)),
(22)
with bf = {ZF,WF}. As in the definition of the weak and
strong ǫ-core in the previous section, we include the overhead
ǫi ≥ 0 in (22) for a deviating player i. In (22), the overhead ǫi
is subtracted from the current utility in C0 when comparing it
to the utility in the new coalition structure C1. The motivation
for this model is as follows: the overhead required for the
utility comparison and communication with the members of
T should make coalition merging more attractive. Later in
(29) and (30) in Section V, we specify two different overhead
models for performance comparison.
According to (22), the notation C0 ≺T C1 means that each
7player in T prefers the coalition structure C1 to C0. Note,
that C0 ≺T C1 indicates that the coalition structure C1 is
preferred to C0 by the players in T and the preferences of
the players in N \ T are not considered in the comparison.
This choice enables the set of deviating coalitions T to
decide on their own if they want to merge without consulting
the remaining players. However, note that the strategies of
deviating coalitions do affect the utilities of all players.
Based on the deviation rule in Definition 3 and the coalition
preference in (22), we formulate a binary relation to compare
two coalition structures.
Definition 4 (q-Dominance): The coalition structure C1 q-
dominates C0, written as C1 ≫q C0, if there exists a set of
coalitions T ⊂ C0 such that C0 q,T−→ C1, and C1 ≺T C0.
According to the previous definitions, we define the coali-
tion formation game as (P ,≫q), where P is the set of all
coalition structures and ≫q is the dominance relation defined
in Definition 4. The solution of the coalition formation game
(P ,≫q) is a set of coalition structures with special stability
properties. We use the coalition structure stable set as a
solution concept for (P ,≫q) adopted from [33, p. 110].
Definition 5 (Coalition Structure Stable Set): The set of
coalition structures R ⊂ P is a coalition structure stable set
of (P ,≫q) if R is both internally and externally stable:
• R is internally stable if there do not exist C, C′ ∈ R such
that C ≫q C′,
• R is externally stable if for all C ∈ P \ R there exists
C′ ∈ R such that C′ ≫q C.
The coalition structure stable set for coalition formation
games is a modification of the stable set solution concept
of coalitional games in characteristic form which has been
originally proposed in [40]. Unlike the core, the stable set is
not necessarily unique.
The coalition structure stable set of (P ,≫q) has at least
one element which is the grand coalition N . As q-Deviation
(Definition 3) only allows merging of coalitions, the coalition
structure N is stable because no deviation is possible. We
assume however that the players start their operation in the
noncooperative state corresponding to the Nash equilibrium
(Section II-B). In order to reach a solution in the coalition
structure stable set, we provide Algorithm 1.4 Step 4 finds
a q-Deviation (Definition 3) by searching over all coalition
merging possibilities given coalition structure Ck and q, the
maximum number of coalitions that are allowed to merge.
For a possible deviating coalition T , the resulting coalition
structure Ck+1 is compared with the previous coalition ac-
cording to q-Dominance (Definition 4). If Step 5 is true, then
the new coalition structure Ck+1 is adopted and the index k
is incremented. If no deviating coalitions satisfy Step 5, then
the algorithm terminates.
Proposition 3: Algorithm 1 converges to a coalition struc-
ture in the coalition structure stable set of (P ,≫q).
Proof: First, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge
since only merging operations are allowed and the number
of merging steps is finite. We prove by contradiction that the
4Other initializing coalition structures can also be supported by Algorithm
1 which may lead to different outcomes.
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resulting coalition structure is in the coalition structure stable
set. Let the solution of the algorithm be Ck. If Ck is outside
the coalition structure stable set of (P ,≫q), then according
to external stability, there exists a coalition structure C′ in the
coalition structure stable set such that C′ ≫q Ck. However, if
this is the case, Ck would not be a solution of Algorithm 1
since Algorithm 1 terminates when no coalition structure is
found that q-dominates the obtained coalition structure. If
Ck is inside the coalition structure stable set of (P ,≫q)
and there is a coalition structure C′′ in the stable set such
that C′′ ≫q Ck, then also Ck would not be a solution of
Algorithm 1. Accordingly, the coalition structure Ck resulting
from Algorithm 1 must be in the coalition structure stable set
of (P ,≫q).
Next, we discuss the complexity for finding a set of coali-
tions which merge according to q-Deviation in Definition 3 and
compare it to an analogous rule based on coalition splitting.
A. Complexity
Our coalition formation algorithm is influenced by the
following works on coalitional games in partition form [41],
[33]. In [41] a solution concept called equilibrium binding
agreements is proposed. The algorithm starts in the grand
coalition, and only splitting operations can occur. The sta-
bility of a coalition structure is based on finding a sequence
of splitting deviations which achieve higher utilities in the
final coalition structure. Moreover, the players are considered
farsighted, i.e., can anticipate the effects of their actions to the
actions of other players. This mechanism is however shown
to be inefficient and has motivated the extension in [33]. In
[33], a coalition formation algorithm is proposed where the
splitting operation proposed in [41] is adapted such that the
coalitions that split can also merge in an arbitrary manner.
Despite the increased complexity, Pareto efficiency is achieved
only in special cases.
The reason for choosing coalition deviation based only on
merging of coalitions in our work is twofold: First, since the
users start their operation in the noncooperative state of single-
player coalitions, coalition formation must be able to merge
8coalitions. Second, the splitting operation is far more complex
than the merging operation, as discussed next.
According to Definition 3, the number of possible ways to
merge a set of at least two and at most q coalitions from the
coalition structure C is
D(|C|, q) =
∑min{q,|C|}
j=2
(|C|
j
)
. (23)
The expression above has no closed form. For the special case
q = |C|, D(|C|, |C|) = 2|C| − |C| − 1 and for q = 2 we get
D(|C|, 2) = (|C|2 − |C|)/2. The worst case complexity corre-
sponds to single-player coalitions because then the number of
coalitions in C is largest and equal to K . This is the initial
coalition structure which starts Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1: The growth rate of D(|C|, q) in (23) is bounded
by O(Kq) for fixed q.
Proof: First, observe that D(|C|, q) ≤ D(K, q) for |C| ≤
K . According to the definitions in [42, 24.1.1], and for q ≤ K
we can calculate
D(K, q) =
∑q
j=2
(
K
j
)
=
∑q
j=2
(
K
K − j
)
(24)
=
K(K − 1)
2!
+
K(K − 1)(K − 2)
3!
+ · · ·
+
q factors︷ ︸︸ ︷
K(K − 1) · · · (K − q + 1)
q!
. (25)
Accordingly, D(K, q) ∈ O(Kq).
In comparison to the merging rule, the number of combi-
nations for splitting a set S to k, k ≤ |S|, subsets is given by
the Stirling number of the second kind [43, Theorem 8.2.6]:
S(|S|, k) = 1
k!
∑k
t=0
(−1)t
(
k
t
)
(k − t)|S|. (26)
If we allow, as we did in the merging case, the splitting of S
into at least two and at most q subsets, we get the following
number of combinations:
T (|S|, q) =
∑q
k=2
S(|S|, k). (27)
For q = |S|, the number above corresponds to the |S|th Bell
number minus one.5 In Fig. 3, we compare the complexity of
the merging and splitting operations for increasing number of
users K and different values of q. It can be observed that the
splitting operation requires much more searching combinations
than the merging operation.
B. Implementation in the MISO interference channel
In Algorithm 2, we provide an implementation of Algorithm
1 in the MISO setting. The algorithm is initialized according
to the Nash equilibrium, i.e., all coalitions are singletons.
The term r = min{q, |C0|} is the number of coalitions that
are allowed to merge. The quantity Θ is initialized to zero
and will aggregate the total number of utility comparisons
during the algorithm. This measure will be used later in the
simulations in Section V to reveal numerically the complexity
of the algorithm.
5The |S|th Bell number is
∑q
k=0 S(|S|, k) and S(|S|, 0)+S(|S|, 1)) = 1.
Algorithm 2 Implementation of Algorithm 1.
1: Input: N , (ǫ1, . . . , ǫK), q, bf = {ZF, WF}
2: Initialize: k = 0, C0 = {{1}, . . . , {K}}, niter, r =
min{q, |C0|}, Θ = 0
3: while r ≥ 2 and |Ck| > 2 do
4: Each user generates lexicographically ordered r-
combinations of Ck: {T1, . . . , T(|Ck|r )};
5: for ℓ = 1 :
(
|Ck|
r
)
do
6: niter = niter + 1;
7: Each user in Tℓ temporarily generates Ck+1 from Ck
by merging Tℓ;
8: Each user i ∈ Tℓ compares his utility ui(F bf(Ck))−
ǫi to ui(F bf(Ck+1));
9: Increment the number of utility comparisons: Θ =
Θ+
∑
S∈Tℓ
|S|;
10: Each user in Tℓ sends a message to the other users
in Tℓ from the set {M1, M2, M3};
11: if all messages are M1 or M2 and some M1 then
12: Users in Tℓ merge to form a single coalition;
13: Users in Tℓ send M4 to users outside Tℓ;
14: k = k + 1 and r = min{q, |Ck|};
15: Go to Step 4;
16: r = r − 1;
17: Output: Ck,Θ
We assume that when a coalition structure forms, such
as Ck = {S1, . . . ,SL}, each coalition is given a unique
index which is commonly known to all users. Moreover we
assume that each user knows the members of each coalition
Si, i = 1, . . . , L. In Step 4 in Algorithm 2, each user generates
a list of r-subsets of the indexes {1, . . . , L} of the coalition
structure Ck and these subsets are ordered in lexicographic
order. The generation of this list can be done using the
algorithm provided in [43, Section 4.4]. In this manner, each
user has the same ordered list of the subsets of {1, . . . , L} of
size r. We assume that all users are synchronized in the sense
that the users consider the same element Tℓ of the generated
list for a period of time in which negotiation takes place.
Then, in Step 7 in Algorithm 2, the new coalition structure
Ck+1 is temporarily formed by merging Tℓ. In Step 8, each
user in Tℓ evaluates his utility in the new coalition. In Step 9,
the number of utility comparisons is incremented according
to the number of users in Tℓ. Following Step 8 in which
the utility comparisons are made, in Step 10 each user in Tℓ
communicates one of the following messages to the other users
in Tℓ:
• (M1) ← utility improves
• (M2) ← utility is the same
• (M3) ← utility decreases
• (M4) ← coalition forms
Note that any of the above four messages can be exchanged
between two links requiring two bits of information. In Step
11, the Pareto dominance relation defined in (22) is examined.
If the condition in Step 11 is true then the coalitions in
Tℓ merge and all users outside Tℓ are informed of the new
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Fig. 4. Average rate of the 8 users in the setting in Fig. 1 using Algorithm 2.
The number under (above) the curve is the number of coalitions with ZF (WF).
coalition structure by exchanging the message M4. Algorithm
2 terminates if the grand coalition is formed or if r, the number
of coalitions to merge, is less than two.
Algorithm 2 provides a structured method to find a possible
mergings between coalitions by exploiting the algorithm in
[43, Section 4.4]. The complexity of Algorithm 2 is however
related to the complexity of an exhaustive search with the
restriction on the maximum number of coalitions that can
merge, q.
Theorem 1: The number of iterations of Algorithm 2 is
bounded as niter ∈ O(Kq).
Proof: In the worst case, only two coalitions merge at a
time, i.e. with r = 2, and the two coalitions which merge
are according to the last element in the r-combination list
generated in Step 4 in Algorithm 2. In addition, in worst case
this described behaviour occurs for every merging occasion
until the grand coalition forms. Accordingly, the worst case
number of iterations of Algorithm 2 is given as:
niter ≤W (K, q) :=
∑K−2
i=0
∑min{q,K−i}
j=2
(
K − i
j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D(K−i,q) in (23)
, (28)
where the first summation in (28) accounts for the maximum
of K − 1 merging of two coalitions before the grand coalition
forms and the second summation corresponds to the worst
case number of iterations within the while loop in Step 3 of
Algorithm 2 before exactly two coalitions merge. The binomial
coefficient
(
K−i
j
)
is the worst case number of iterations within
the for loop before the if condition in Step 11 is true
according to which coalition merging occurs. From Lemma
1 and observing that i = 0 in (28) admits the largest growth
for the upper bound, we obtain the complexity result.
Accordingly, Algorithm 2 has polynomial time complexity
for fixed q. The worst case number of iterations W (K, q) in
(28) is illustrated in Fig. 3.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first consider the setting with 8 links in Fig. 1. Using
the coalition formation algorithm in Algorithm 2, the average
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Fig. 5. User rates at 25 dB SNR.
user rate is plotted for increasing SNR in Fig. 4 where we
set q = 8 and ǫ = 0 as input to the algorithm. In the
low SNR regime, single-player coalitions exist supporting
Proposition 2. Note that in the low SNR regime, the outcome
with joint MRT is efficient [15]. In the mid SNR regime,
coalition formation improves the joint performance of the
links from the Nash equilibrium. Optimal average user rate
is obtained using the monotonic optimization algorithm from
the supplementary material of [7]. There, the beamforming
space is not restricted to ZF or WF scheme. The average user
rate in Nash equilibrium saturates in the high SNR regime.
This is contrary to ZF and WF coalition formation where the
average user rate increases linearly due to the formation of
the grand coalition. The formation of the grand coalition in
the high SNR regime supports Proposition 1.
Comparing the WF and ZF schemes, it is observed in
Fig. 4 that with WF precoding, larger coalitions form at
lower SNR values than with ZF beamforming. As a result,
higher average user rate gains are achieved with WF coalition
formation than with ZF coalition formation. For example, at
SNR = 25 dB, the coalition structure with WF precoding is
{{1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, {2}}while the coalition structure with ZF
beamforming is {{1, 3}, {2}, {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}}. Observe that the
coalition {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} is the cluster of links in the bottom
right side of Fig. 1. This set of links form a single coalition
to reduce the interference between one another. The achieved
user rates at 25 dB SNR are shown in Fig. 5. For user one,
it is observed that optimal beamforming reduces his utility
compared to the Nash equilibrium. Hence, the maximum sum
rate beamforming strategy is not acceptable for player one and
consequently the maximum sum rate strategy is not stable for
joint cooperation. For both WF and ZF schemes, player two is
in a single-player coalition. However, his rate in both schemes
is higher than in Nash equilibrium. This reveals that in this
case, the formed coalitions outside {2} have positive effects
on player two.
In the following figures, we consider 8 users with 8
antennas each and we average the performance over 103
random channel realizations. First, in Fig. 6 - Fig. 9 we
compare the performance of WF and ZF coalition formation
for different values of q. We also relate and compare our
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Fig. 6. Comparison of average user rates achieved with Algorithm 2 for
different values of q. The overhead is set to ǫ = 0.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of average user rates achieved with Algorithm 2 and
coalition formation algorithms from [26] and [30]. The overhead is ǫ = 0.
results to the coalition formation algorithms in [26] and [30].
Then, in Fig. 11 - Fig. 13 we plot the performance of coalition
formation for two overhead models defined in (29) and (30).
In Fig. 6, the average user rate is plotted for different values
of q. The parameters q influences the deviation rule as defined
in Definition 3 and specifies the largest number of coalitions
which are allowed to merge in one iteration of Algorithm 2. It
is shown that as q increases, higher performance is obtained.
Interestingly, although the number of iterations of Algorithm 2
is not restricted, performance loss still occurs for smaller q.
In Fig. 7, we compare our algorithm with the algorithms
in [26] and [30, Algorithm 1]. Note that the system models
and cooperation models in [26] and [30] are different than
ours. In [26] cooperation between a set of base stations is
based on network MIMO schemes which require exchange
of user data between the transmitter. In [30], a MIMO inter-
ference channel is considered and cooperation in a coalition
is according to ZF transmission. In the proposed coalition
formation algorithm in [26], the deviation rule is based on
merging of two coalitions, i.e., corresponds to 2-Deviation
in Definition 3, and the comparison relation is according to
2-Dominance in Definition 4. Hence, the algorithm in [26]
corresponds to our algorithm with q = 2, and the authors
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the average number of utility comparisons Θ required
by Algorithm 2 for different values of q.
prove that the resulting coalition structure lies in the recursive
core of their coalition formation game. In Fig. 7, the average
performance of the links for q = 2 is less than for q = 3
and is higher than for [30, Algorithm 1] which is based on
individual stability. In Fig. 7, it is shown that the average
performance of individual stability is slightly higher than in
Nash equilibrium. Note however that the performance of [30,
Algorithm 1] can be significantly improved for sufficiently
large number of antennas at the transmitters.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 lead us to the conclusion that in
multi-antenna interference channels, performance improve-
ment through cooperation with ZF or WF beamforming de-
pends greatly on the number of users that are allowed to
deviate and cooperate at a time.
In Fig. 8, the average number of coalitions obtained from
Algorithm 2 are plotted and compared to [30, Algorithm 1].
The average number of coalitions with the ZF beamforming
scheme is larger than with the WF beamforming scheme,
i.e., with WF more coalitions merge than with ZF. At low
SNR, single player coalitions exist with ZF beamforming.
This illustrates the result in Proposition 2. Since, WF beam-
forming converges to MRT beamforming at low SNR, we
observe that in this SNR regime some coalitions form with
WF beamforming. As q increases, the average number of
11
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by Algorithm 2 for different values of q.
coalitions decreases. This explains the performance loss in
Fig. 6. Both, WF and ZF coalition formation obtain the same
number of coalitions for the same q at high SNR. This is
because WF beamforming converges to ZF beamforming in
this SNR regime. Coalition formation with [30, Algorithm 1]
leads to high average number of coalitions which means that
the number of users that cooperate is small.
In Fig. 9, the average number of utility comparisons during
Algorithm 2 is plotted for different q. Note, that Algorithm 2
starts in single-player coalitions and the users initially search
for the largest number of coalitions to merge. The number
of utility comparisons Θ during the search is specified in
Step 8 in Algorithm 2 and corresponds to the total number of
utility comparisons the users need to do before the algorithm
converges. It is shown in Fig. 9 that the WF scheme requires
generally much lower number of utility comparisons than the
ZF scheme. The reason for this is with the WF scheme more
coalitions merge than with the ZF scheme according to Fig. 8
which leads to faster convergence rate of Algorithm 2 with
WF beamforming than with the ZF scheme. The number of
utility comparisons Θ generally decreases for smaller q since
the number of possible deviations decreases. For a specific q,
it is observed that Θ is not monotonic with SNR. With ZF
beamforming, the number of utility comparisons increases at
around −5 dB SNR and afterwards decreases. The reason for
this behavior is at very low SNR no coalitions merge and hence
Algorithm 2 terminates after searching over all merging pos-
sibilities of single-player coalitions. At around −5 dB SNR,
a small number of coalitions merge and hence Algorithm 2
requires additional iterations to search for possible merging in
the new coalition structure. Since the number of coalitions that
merge is small, the number of comparisons is large. At larger
SNR, the number of coalitions that merge increases and hence
the coalitions are found faster than at smaller SNR. At high
SNR, the grand coalition is then favorable for all the users
and for q = 8 it is possible to build the grand coalition in a
single iteration of Algorithm 2. This is contrary to the case
q < 8 which explains the performance advantage of q = 8.
In Fig. 10, we can see that [30, Algorithm 1] requires a low
number of utility comparisons and hence has low complexity.
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Fig. 11. Comparison of average user rates of Algorithm 2 with q = 8 for
the overhead models specified in (29) and (30).
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Fig. 12. Comparison of average number of coalitions resulting from
Algorithm 2 with q = 8 for the overhead models specified in (29) and (30).
For the subsequent plots, we define two overhead models
to specify ǫ for a given coalition structure C as follows:
ǫi =
|S|
|N |ui(w
bf
1 , . . . ,w
bf
K), i ∈ S,S ∈ C, (29)
ǫi =
1
|N |ui(w
bf
1 , . . . ,w
bf
K), for all i ∈ N , (30)
with bf = {ZF,WF}. According to (29) and following the
comparison relation in (22), the overhead for a user which
examines whether to join a coalition S increases with the
size of S. In (30), the overhead is assumed to be fixed. In
both overhead models in (29) and (30), we assume that the
overhead is proportional to the utility in the grand coalition
since it corresponds to the largest overhead needed to examine
whether the grand coalition forms.
In Fig. 11 - Fig. 13, we set q = 8 and plot the performance
of Algorithm 2. In Fig. 11, the average user rate in both ZF
and WF schemes is similar with both overhead models in (29)
and (30) and no overhead (ǫi = 0). With ZF beamforming, it is
shown that higher average user rate improvement is achieved
for larger overhead. The explanation of this effect is that
with larger overhead more coalitions merge as is shown in
Fig. 12. With WF coalition formation, it is shown that with the
proposed overhead models, the grand coalition always forms
in the simulation setup.
In Fig. 13, the average number of utility comparisons Θ
required during Algorithm 2 is plotted. With WF beamform-
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Fig. 13. Comparison of average number of utility comparisons Θ in
Algorithm 2 with q = 8 for the overhead models specified in (29) and (30).
ing, Θ is very low which reveals that the WF beamforming
scheme requires less complexity in coalition formation than
ZF beamforming. Generally, with ZF beamforming and higher
overhead, the number of utility comparisons decrease. This is
observed after approximately −2.5 dB SNR. At low SNR,
the number of utility comparisons are larger including the
overhead compared to no overhead because a small number
of users merge to form coalitions as is shown in Fig. 12.
Consequently, a larger number of searches during Algorithm 2
is required. In comparison to no overhead, it can be observed
that the maximum number of utility comparisons shifts to the
left on the SNR axis as the overhead increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We study cooperation in the MISO IFC using coalitional
games. A transmitter’s noncooperative transmission strategy
is MRT. We consider ZF or WF precoding for cooperative
user transmission in a coalition. The necessary and sufficient
conditions under which all users profit from joint cooperation
with ZF are characterized. It is shown that incorporating
an overhead in deviation of a coalition enlarges the set of
conditions under which the users have the incentive to coop-
erate compared to the case without considering the overhead.
Afterwards, we consider coalitional formation games and
propose a distributed coalition formation algorithm based on
coalition merging. The complexity of the algorithm is tuneable
and its implementation requires two-bit signalling between
the transmitters. We prove that the algorithm terminates in
polynomial time and generates a coalition structure in the
coalition structure stable set. The performance improvement
of the links through cooperation with simple distributed trans-
mission schemes is achieved and depends on the complexity
for coalition deviation and user-specific overhead measures.
As future work, we will extend the current work to consider
multiple antennas at both the transmitters and receivers. More-
over, we will generalize to multi cell settings in which multiple
receivers are associated with each transmitter. Significant to
study for these settings is the appropriate design for the
cooperative precoding schemes used within the coalition. Nev-
ertheless, our interest is also to investigate different solution
concepts for coalitional games in partition form and also to
draw comparisons between them.
TABLE I
CASE STUDY FOR ANALYSING THE QUADRATIC EQUATION IN (33).
Case I ǫi = 0
Case II ǫi > 0 and ∆i,S < 0
Case III ǫi > 0 and ∆i,S ≥ 0 and σ21 + σ22 ≤ 0
Case IV ǫi > 0 and ∆i,S ≥ 0 and σ21 + σ22 > 0
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Considering an arbitrary player i in an arbitrary coalition
S, we write the condition in (10) as
log2
(
1 +
|hHiiwZFi→S |2
σ2 +
∑
j∈N\S |hHjiwMRTj |2
)
− ǫi
≤ log2
(
1 +
|hHiiwZFi→N |2
σ2
)
, (31)
which is equivalent to
1 +
Ai,S
σ2 +Bi,S
≤ 2ǫi + 2ǫi Ci
σ2
, (32)
where the introduced notations Ai,S , Bi,S , and Ci are given
in (14c) and (14d) in Proposition 1. Cross multiplying (32)
and solving for σ2 we get the following condition
f(σ2) ≥ 0, σ2 > 0, (33)
where f(σ2) := (2ǫi − 1)(σ2)2 + (2ǫi(Bi,S + Ci)− (Bi,S +
Ai,S))σ
2 + 2ǫiCiBi,S . In order to analyze (33), a case study
is summarized in Table I and illustrated in Fig. 14.
If ǫi = 0, then f(σ2) in (33) is a straight line as in Case I
in Fig. 14. The condition in (33) reduces to
(Ci −Ai,S)σ2 + CiBi,S ≥ 0, (34)
σ20 :=
CiBi,S
Ai,S − Ci ≥ σ
2 > 0, (35)
and corresponds to the shaded region in Fig. 14.
If ǫi > 0, and having (2ǫi −1) > 0 then the quadratic poly-
nomial f(σ2) in (33) describes a parabola with a minimum
and opens upwards as illustrated in Cases II-IV in Fig. 14. If
the minimum of the parabola is strictly larger than zero (Case
II in Fig. 14), then the quadratic equation has no real roots
and the discriminant of f(σ2) is negative, i.e.,
∆i,S := (2
ǫi(Bi,S + Ci)− (Bi,S +Ai,S))2
− 4(2ǫi − 1)2ǫiCiBi,S < 0. (36)
If (36) is satisfied, so is the condition in (33) for any 0 < σ2 <
∞ because the entire parabola has strictly positive values.
For ∆i,S ≥ 0, f(σ2) in (33) has two real roots which
corresponds to Cases III and IV in Fig. 14. Then condition
(33) holds for
σ2 ≤ σ21 or σ2 ≥ σ22 and σ2 > 0, (37)
where σ21 and σ22 are the roots of f(σ2) in (33) given as
σ21 =
−Ψi,S −
√
∆i,S
2(2ǫi − 1) , σ
2
2 =
−Ψi,S +
√
∆i,S
2(2ǫi − 1) . (38)
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Fig. 14. Illustrations for the case study of the quadratic inequality in (33).
with Ψi,S := (2ǫi(Bi,S + Ci)− (Bi,S +Ai,S)) ≥ 0.
The product of both roots is [42, 3.8.1]: σ21σ22 =
(2ǫiCiBi,S)/(2
ǫi − 1) ≥ 0. Thus, both roots have the same
sign. In order to determine whether both roots are negative or
positive we study their sum. The sum of the roots is less than
or equal to zero if and only if
Ψi,S := (2
ǫi(Bi,S + Ci)− (Bi,S +Ai,S)) ≥ 0. (39)
Under the above condition, (37) is satisfied for any 0 < σ2 <
∞ because the largest root is negative.
In Case IV, the sum of the roots in (38) is strictly positive.
This is satisfied if and only if
log2 (Bi,S +Ai,S)− log2 (Bi,S + Ci) > ǫi. (40)
In this case, the condition in (37) is illustrated in the shaded
areas in Case IV in Fig. 14.
Note that Cases I-IV are all possibilities to study (33)
associated with a user i in coalition S. Combining Cases I-IV,
we formulate the lower and upper bounds on σ2 for a specific
user i in a coalition S in (13) and (12), respectively. Since
the derived conditions in (37) must hold for all players and
all coalitions, we must take the maximum over all players and
all coalitions on the lower bound σ22 (largest root of f(σ2) in
(33)) and the minimum over all players and coalitions for the
upper bound σ21 (smallest root of f(σ2)).
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